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Abstract
Background: In response to the magnitude of harms caused by alcohol, the World Health Organization (WHO) Global 
Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol (GAS) was endorsed in 2010. We analysed submissions to the 2019 WHO 
consultation on the implementation of the GAS to identify how different stakeholders frame alcohol use and control; and 
to assess how stakeholders engage with the consultation process, with possibly harmful consequences for public health 
policy. 
Methods: All submissions from WHO Member States, international organisations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), academic institutions and private sector entities were identified and used as data for an inductive framing 
analysis. This involved close reading and data familiarisation, thematic coding and identifying emergent framings. 
Through the analysis of texts, framing analysis can give insights into the values and interests of stakeholders. Because 
framing influences how issues are conceptualised and addressed, framing analysis is a useful tool to study policy-making 
processes. 
Results: We identified 161 unique submissions and seven attachments. Emerging frames were grouped according to 
their function: defining the problem, assigning causation, proposing solutions, or justifying and persuading. Submissions 
varied in terms of the framing they deployed and how this was presented, eg, how the problem was defined. Proposed 
policy solutions also varied. Targeted solutions emphasising individual responsibility tended to be supported by industry 
and some Member States. Calls for universal regulation and global mobilisation often came from NGOs and academia. 
Stakeholders drew on evidence and specific value systems to support the adoption of certain problem and solution ideas 
and to oppose competing framing.
Conclusion: Alcohol control is a contested policy field in which different stakeholders use framing to set the agenda 
and influence what policy solutions are considered legitimate. WHO should consider which interests are served by these 
different framings and how to weigh different stakeholders in the consultation process. 
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Background
Alcohol is responsible for 5.1% of the global burden of disease 
from both non-communicable and infectious diseases, and 
10% of the premature deaths among people aged 15-49 
years.1 Alcohol use is also associated with secondary harms to 
those close to heavy drinkers, such as children2 and intimate 
partners,3 and contributes to wider societal harms due to 
alcohol-related violence, crime and road traffic incidents.4-6 
These harms are greater among those who are more socio-
economically deprived,7,8 rendering alcohol a key driver of 
social and health inequities. In order to address these issues, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Strategy to 
Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol (GAS) was endorsed by 
the 63rd World Health Assembly in May 2010.9 The GAS aims 
to raise global awareness about alcohol harms; to strengthen 
the knowledge base on the determinants of alcohol harms 
and effective interventions; to increase technical support 
and Member State capacity; to strengthen partnerships and 
increase resource mobilization; and to improve systems 
of monitoring and surveillance.9 However, despite alcohol 
control efforts at national and global level, a 2019 WHO 
discussion paper on the implementation of the GAS concluded 
that the strategy did not result in a global decrease in alcohol 
consumption.10 According to data from the WHO Global 
Status Report on Alcohol and Health, the European Region 
was the only area where per capita alcohol consumption 
decreased between 2010 and 2018. On the other hand, certain 
regions of the world, most notably South-East Asia, saw an 
increase in alcohol consumption.10 The implementation of 
evidence-based alcohol policy was similarly more successful 
in high-income countries than in low- and middle-income 
countries. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Alcohol harms are conceptualised differently by stakeholders in different sectors, using different framing, which has consequences for how the 
issue is understood and what action is advocated to prevent and control the harmful use of alcohol.
• Private sector entities and some Member States predominantly framed alcohol harms as a problem of individual responsibility with largely 
individual consequences, therefore requiring targeted interventions instead of population-level regulation.
• Most Member States, international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academic institutions who engaged with the 
consultation framed alcohol harms as a collective problem with wide-ranging harmful consequences beyond health, thus requiring regulation 
and national (eg, ‘best buys’) and global level (eg, binding treaty).   
• Some private sector entities appeared to reject the notion of inherent conflicts of interest between public health and the alcohol industry, while 
most stakeholders in other sectors called for restrictions on industry interference in alcohol policy given the evidence of industry attempts at 
policy influence or dilution. 
• The values and interests underlying the identified framings should be taken into account by World Health Organization (WHO) when assessing 
policy proposals. The role that is given to alcohol industry stakeholders in dialogue and consultations with the WHO should be carefully 
considered.
Implications for the public
Alcohol use is a significant risk factor for deaths and ill-health worldwide and is therefore high on the public health agenda, exemplified by the 
adoption of the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol (GAS). This analysis of submissions to 
a consultation on the WHO GAS reveals that stakeholders in the alcohol policy-making process have different views on the problem of harmful 
use of alcohol, its causes and potential solutions. Divergence is especially prominent between private sector entities with commercial interests in 
alcohol production and some Member States; and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academic institutions and most Member States and 
international organisations. The different framings that are used by stakeholders with competing interests have consequences for the alcohol control 
policies that are considered and implemented at national and global level.
Key Messages 
The discussion paper on the implementation of the GAS was 
led by the WHO and drew on data collection and consultations 
with Member States. Participation from other societal 
stakeholders was sought through a web-based consultation.11 
The consultation was intended to give stakeholders the 
opportunity to share their perspectives on the implementation 
of the GAS and priority areas for future action. Consultations 
are used by governments and international organisations with 
the stated intention of giving affected parties an opportunity 
to provide information, evidence, and express their opinion 
about what and how decisions should be taken. In these 
ways, those taking part in consultations can contribute to the 
evidence and feedback gathering stage of the policy-making 
process.12 If well-conducted, consultations provide useful 
information and perspectives, and make decision-making 
processes more just and equitable by giving civil society access 
to debates that are usually only accessible to public bodies and 
lobbyists. 
However, consultations can also be used by vested 
interests to attempt to influence policy processes in ways that 
undermine public health.13 Analysis of public consultations 
can allow for the exploration of such strategies and provides 
insights into how a particular topic is conceptualised and/or 
contested by different stakeholders. This is particularly likely 
in the case of alcohol harms, where in Ralston and colleagues’ 
terms, there are well-documented ‘fault lines’ between 
commercial and other non-state actors.14,15 Other research 
documents the way in which industries, such as the tobacco 
and alcohol industries, manipulate the consultation process to 
disseminate industry framings, amplify their voice, and over-
burden the process with substantial volumes of material.16-19 
Identifying and analysing such framing is a precondition 
for developing counter frames that can challenge industry 
interpretations.
In this paper, we analyse the responses to WHO’s 
consultation on the implementation of the GAS. Our analysis 
aims to assess how different stakeholders frame the problem 
of harmful use of alcohol, its causes and proposed solutions 
in their submissions, and how their framing is justified and 
sustained in order to advance a specific agenda. 
Methods
The Data
Between October 24, and November 4, 2019, the WHO 
hosted a web-based consultation on the Discussion Paper 
‘Implementation of the WHO global strategy to reduce 
the harmful use of alcohol during the first decade since its 
endorsement, and the way forward.’10 The consultation was 
open to WHO Member States and governmental institutions, 
United Nations (UN) and other inter-governmental 
organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), academic institutions, and private sector entities (ie, 
trade associations and industry-funded NGOs, charities, and 
social aspects organisations [organisations that deliver the 
alcohol industry’s corporate social responsibility goals]). For 
this analysis, we obtained all 189 submissions from the WHO 
website,11 of which 161 were unique submissions (Table 1; see 
full list in Supplementary file 1). Five submissions written in 
French and four written in Spanish were translated by CR 
and MP and included in the analysis (Supplementary file 
1). Attachments to the submissions that contained either 
the full response to the consultation or presented additional 
information written as part of an organisations’ response to 
the consultation were also analysed. Attachments that were 
not directly relevant to the consultation (eg, campaigns, 
evaluations, legal documents) were not included in the data 
set as the strategic use of such documents was deemed to be 
outside the scope of this framing analysis.
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Theoretical Approach
The consultation submissions were analysed using an 
inductive coding approach focusing on identifying the 
framing employed within the texts. A frame, or the act of 
framing, may be conceptualised as a principle of organisation, 
a way of comprehending and assigning subjective meaning to 
an event or issue, and in that way promoting a particular way 
of seeing the world while concealing or marginalising other 
ideas, explanations and viewpoints.20,21 Framing serves to 
promote particular ideas and perspectives and render them as 
established ‘objective’ truths, that is, as the ‘taken-for-granted’ 
way of conceptualising and perceiving social reality.22 While 
frames themselves are sometimes seen as static, pre-existing 
‘objects,’22,23 the interactive process of framing (ie, constructing 
and promoting frames) is by definition dynamic and actor-
led and thus appropriate for the analysis of policy processes.21 
In the policy-making arena, actors use framing to set the 
agenda and influence both how problems are understood 
and what policy solutions are considered.23 As such, framing 
organises previous knowledge and values around a policy 
problem and serves to guide the action taken in response.21 
Through framing, actors may seek to have their frames and 
ideas adopted as the ‘common sense’ understanding of an 
issue. What emerges from this dynamic process is based 
on what aspects of the issue are emphasised, how they are 
named, categorised and narrated by those involved, and the 
extent to which certain frames become ‘normalised.’ While 
this sense-making exercise is a necessary aspect of policy-
making, it is also a political act. Hence, even in absence of 
institutionalised decision-making power, actors can exercise 
power over policy-making processes by shaping the dominant 
discourse around a policy issue.24 Identifying the dominant 
framing can give more insight into policy-making processes 
and forms the basis of this analysis. Similar approaches using 
framing analysis have previously been applied to public health 
issues,14,23,25-28 and the analysis of health-related consultation 
submissions.15,29 Due to the structured nature of the WHO 
consultation, the current analysis draws from Entman’s four 
framing functions: defining the problem, diagnosing causes, 
making moral judgements and suggesting remedies.20 
Data Analysis
In the first stage of the analysis, CR, MCvS and MP coded and 
discussed six submissions from different stakeholder groups 
to create an initial, non-exhaustive coding list to act as a guide 
to the subsequent coding. All submissions were then open 
coded independently by CR, MCvS and MP using Excel and 
NVivo 12. The 52 unique codes that emerged from the data 
were reviewed by CR to ensure coherence in coding between 
authors. Discrepancies were resolved through discussion. 
To minimise the extent to which the framing analysis would 
be influenced by previous framing studies of alcohol policy 
stakeholders,14,25 the coded data was anonymised by removing 
any reference to the submitting organisation. Frames were 
identified by CR, MCvS and MP by repeatedly reading the 
anonymised coded data. Coding was conducted using an 
‘open’ approach, meaning it was guided by conceptual codes 
based on framing theory (eg, defining the problem, naming, 
categorising, narrating, assigning causation, proposing 
solutions)20,21 but also complemented by the identification 
of emergent codes as the data was analysed.30 This was an 
iterative process with several rounds of discussions amongst 
authors to reach consensus on framing functions and 
frames, and their interplay. Emergent frames were reviewed 
independently by a fourth researcher (ME). Frames were 
organised into higher order categories based on their framing 
function, a process previously identified to facilitate greater 
interpretation of the data, the interaction between different 
frames and the integration of theory.23 Once consensus was 
reached among all researchers through open discussion, 
individual stakeholders and stakeholder groups (ie, Member 
States, IGOs, NGOs, academic institutions and private 
sector entities) were linked to the identified policy framings. 
This was done with attention to both differences between 
and within stakeholder groups, thus recognising that these 
‘groups’ are not necessarily homogeneous in terms of their 
use of framing.31
Results
Twelve frames were identified in the consultation submissions 
and grouped according to their function: (1) defining the 
Table 1. Overview of Submissions to the Web-Based Consultation on the Implementation of the WHO GAS Since its Endorsement, and the Way Forward
Stakeholder Group Number of Submissions






Number of Attachments 
Analysedd
Member States and governmental institutions 29 29 109-2058 5 0
UN system and other IGOs 4 4 166-684 2 1
Academic institutions 7 7 119-3487 4 0
NGOs 106 80b 72-7703 50 3
Private sector entitiesa 43 41c 322-3727 29 3
Total 189 161 - 90 7
Abbreviations: WHO, World Health Organization; GAS, Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol; UN, United Nations; IGOs, inter-governmental 
organisations; NGOs, non-governmental organisations.
a Trade associations and industry-funded NGOs, social aspects organisations and charities (of which one was originally submitted as an ‘NGO’). 
b The International Organisation of Good Templars’ (IOGT) response to the consultation was submitted 20 times in total by its member organisations and 
other organisations endorsing its response. The Global Alcohol Policy Alliance’s response was submitted seven times in total. The Alcohol Health Alliance and 
the Institute of Alcohol Studies submitted the same response. 
c The Caribbean Breweries Association, Regional Beverage Alcohol Alliance, and Trinidad & Tobago Beverage Alcohol Alliance submitted the same response. 
d Attachments presenting additional information written in response to the consultation, after removal of duplicates. 
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problem, (2) assigning causation, (3) proposing solutions, or 
(4) justifying and persuading (Table 2, see Supplementary files 
2-5 for an expanded version). These four framing functions 
are presented separately in this analysis but were often found 
to be interlinked. Certain framings of the ‘problem,’ such 
as that alcohol harm is an issue for a minority of ‘at risk’ 
individuals, similarly function to foreground and implicitly 
suggest that the solution must ‘target’ this ‘high-risk’ minority. 
Defining the Problem 
Defining the (Harmful) Use of Alcohol
Two competing framings of the conceptualisation of the 
(harmful) use of alcohol were identified. The first perspective 
adopts a limited view, seeing alcohol consumption as an issue 
only when undertaken to what is referred to as ‘excessive’ 
consumption as opposed to an undefined ‘moderation’ – 
especially by individuals in at-risk groups (eg, minors, pregnant 
women) or those who engage in specific risky behaviours (eg, 
drink driving). This framing was adopted by all private sector 
entities, two Member States (Permanent Representation of 
Italy to the International Organizations and the United States) 
and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (IGO). 
Many of their submissions used framing that emphasised the 
‘excessive’ use of alcohol to call for the WHO to continue its 
focus on the harmful use of alcohol and associated indicators 
exclusively, for example: “indicators of HED [heavy episodic 
drinking] and alcohol related mortality and morbidity are 
much more relevant in measuring progress against the Global 
Alcohol Strategy than changes in per capita consumption” (The 
UK alcoholic drinks trade associations, trade association). 
While additional indicators for alcohol harms are useful and 
already in use by WHO, many of these submissions appear 
to suggest that per capita alcohol consumption should not be 
emphasised at all, thus minimising its contribution to alcohol 
harm. Examples include the statements: “The focus going 
forward should continue to be on tackling harmful drinking.” 
(The UK alcoholic drinks trade associations) and “It is 
important that the focus remain on the harmful use of alcohol, 
not consumption per se.” (West Indies Rum & Sprits Producers 
Association, trade association). 
Another framing posits alcohol use in general (often defined 
as ‘per capita consumption’ or simply ‘alcohol consumption’) 
as the problem and appears to be based on the ample evidence 
that any level of consumption can be harmful. Most NGOs and 
academic institutions adopted this framing to call for a shift 
in language and focus, and suggested that replacing the term 
‘harmful use of alcohol’ with ‘use of alcohol’ “would alleviate 
confusion and support countries and people in understanding 
the degree of risk associated with alcohol use” (NCD Alliance, 
NGO). However, the two identified framings of the problem 
definition are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some 
NGOs, academic institutions and Member States emphasised 
both the risks associated with alcohol consumption in general 
and those of harmful consumption by specific vulnerable 
groups (eg, children and youth), who were believed to require 
additional protection. Unlike most industry submissions that 
limited the problem definition to ‘excessive’ use of alcohol, 
these submissions did not make a case for (exclusively) 
focusing on more harmful manifestations of alcohol use. 
They also adopted language that emphasised the need to 
protect vulnerable groups, rather than focusing on them or 
their behaviours as ‘the problem.’ 
Narrowing Versus Broadening the Scope of the Problem 
While no organisation explicitly denied that alcohol causes 
significant harms in their submission, some stakeholders 
narrowed the focus of such harms to problematic individuals. 
This framing was mostly put forward by private sector 
entities, who also tended to focus exclusively on ‘harmful 
use of alcohol’ as opposed to consumption per se. These 
stakeholders tended to explicitly dismiss a wider population 
framing with the argument that “identifying cohorts where 
alcohol issues exist and addressing those risks should be the 
focus” (DrinkWise, Australian industry-funded charity) 
and that “abstinence guidelines should therefore target […] 
dependent and problematic drinkers, not moderate drinkers” 
(Educ’alcool, industry-funded charity, translated). Some 
private sector entities also referred to secondary harms 
compatible with this narrower focus on a sub-populations’ 
risky behaviours, such as foetal alcohol spectrum disorders 
resulting from drinking during pregnancy; or fatalities 
resulting from drink driving. For example, The Caribbean 
Breweries Association (trade association) acknowledged that 
“[i]n 2015, the Dominican Republic had the highest estimated 
rate of fatalities from road accidents in the Americas,” which 
it partly attributed to “harmful drinking” and drink driving. 
Conversely, the broader view that alcohol use has negative 
consequences for society as a whole was typically proposed 
by NGOs, academic institutions, Member States and IGOs. 
Their framing of the problem emphasised the importance of 
widening the scope of alcohol control to noncommunicable 
diseases as well as to alcohol’s “impact on families and 
communities, its detrimental effects on productivity and 
economic growth, and its role in stressing and weakening 
already under-resourced health systems in low- and middle-
income countries” (Kettil Bruun Society for Social and 
Epidemiological Research on Alcohol, NGO). 
Assigning Causation 
The different ways in which stakeholders framed the problem 
of (harmful) use of alcohol appeared to be partnered with 
framings assigning different causes to the problem. Typically, 
these were individual choice, social norms and under-
regulation. 
Individual Choice
According to the ‘individual choice’ framing, harms associated 
with alcohol are caused by a minority who do not drink 
‘responsibly.’ None of the submissions included a definition of 
what was meant exactly with ‘responsible drinking.’ Harmful 
drinking choices were framed as being a consequence of lack 
of information and awareness about the risks associated with 
alcohol, emphasising “the capacity to make positive changes, 
and therefore good health choices” (Drinkaware, industry-
funded charity). Another claimed reason for ‘irresponsible’ 
behaviour is the insufficient availability of alternative 
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Table 2. Overview of the Framing That Emerged From the Submissions, and Their Categorisation Into Framing Functions
Framing 




The (harmful) use of alcohol  
1.	 Harmful use of alcohol, especially by 
individuals in at-risk groups or who 
engage in risky behaviours, is the 
problem
2.	 Alcohol use (eg, per capita 
consumption) is the problem
1.	 “Put more emphasis on harm indicators related to HED, Underage drinking, 
mortality and morbidity linked to harmful use of alcohol” (CEEV, trade association).
2.	 “The term “harmful use” is misleading given the Global Burden of Disease Study 
suggested the level of consumption that minimizes health loss is 0” (School of Public 
Health, The University of Hong Kong, academic institution).
Narrowing versus broadening the scope of 
the problem  
1.	 Negative consequences for individuals 
in at-risk groups or who engage in risky 
behaviours
2.	 Negative health, social and economic 
consequences for wider society
1.	 “With evidence (in Australia) that more consumers who drink are choosing to 
moderate their consumption, identifying cohorts where alcohol issues exist and 
addressing those risks should be the focus” (DrinkWise, industry-funded charity).
2.	 “Alcohol consumption risks harm to the welfare not only of the drinker but also of 
others, and can impede sustainable social and economic development” (Kettil Bruun 
Society for Social and Epidemiological Research on Alcohol, NGO).
Assigning 
causation 
Individual choice: Alcohol misuse is caused 
by uninformed individual choices
• “For general consumers, the priority is to ensure that the consumers are best informed 
about the choices they make” (Drinks Ireland, trade association).
Social norms: Alcohol misuse is a deep-
rooted social norm 
• “The ultimate challenge, to cite the Discussion Paper, is that “Alcohol consumption is 
embedded in social norms and traditions,” which makes it a more complex and difficult 
behaviour to change” (Drinkaware, industry-funded charity).
Under-regulation: Alcohol misuse is caused 
by the widespread and underregulated 
availability, affordability and marketing of 
alcohol
• “Over the past decade, the world has not seen progress regarding alcohol prevention 
and control: neither in reducing alcohol consumption and related harm, nor in increasing 
alcohol policy best buy implementation” (IOGT, NGO).
Proposing 
solutions
Targeted interventions versus population-
level regulation
1.	 Broad ‘menu’ of policy options targeted 
at at-risk individuals or risky behaviours  
2.	 Universal implementation of the three 
‘best buys’ at population level
1.	 “Heaviest drinkers, including heavy episodic drinkers, are the least sensitive to 
pricing policies. To be effective, a regulatory framework, which includes taxation, 
must be accompanied by interventions aimed specifically at harmful drinking” 
(Brazilian Beer Trade Association, trade association).
2.	 “Over the last decade, WHO and health researchers confirmed the relevance of the 
so called ‘best buys’ to cost-effectively reduce and prevent alcohol related harm. 
Therefore, continuation of these policy directions should be envisaged” (European 
Alcohol Policy Alliance, NGO).
Local versus global solutions
1.	 Local action specific to the national 
context (no ‘one size fits all’)
2.	 Global action to address cross-border 
issues and industry interference
1.	“Where improvements have been made, a crucial element has been the recognition that 
harmful use of alcohol often requires tailored, local and culturally-sensitive measures” 
(AssoBirra, trade association).
2.	“We also see a great value in international cooperation in any form to address the cross-
border issues of alcohol policy” (Ministry of Social Affairs of Estonia, Member State).
Partnership versus freedom from industry 
interference
1.	 Involvement from a broad array of 
stakeholders, including industry 
2.	 The public sector should be 
independent from industry interference
1.	“Governments and international organisations need to work with industry and 
communities to develop evidence-based, targeted and effective initiatives to reduce 
harmful drinking” (Australian Grape and Wine Inc., trade association).
2.	“Countries need stronger support with technical capacity building regarding alcohol 
policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and safeguarding alcohol prevention 




Use of evidence:  To support or oppose 
problem definitions, causes and solutions
• “Duty increases have been evidenced to save lives and reduce harm (…)” (Humankind 
Charity, NGO).
• “The relation between Per Capita consumption or Prevalence and Harmful Consumption 
cannot be directly linked, more studies are required” (Cerveceros Latinoamericanos, 
trade association).
Tobacco control analogies: Alcohol control 
requires a similar approach to tobacco 
control
• “In line with what happens with tobacco, in article 5.3 of the FCTC, and in recognition of 
the inherent conflicts of interest that exist, there need to be strict rules prescribing the 
types of engagement permitted between states and international agencies on the one 
hand and economic operators/the liquor industry on the other” (South African Medical 
Research Council, Member State).
Use of value systems
1.	 Neoliberal values: Individuals have the 
right to consume alcohol, and alcohol 
harms should be addressed by the 
private sector 
2.	 Human rights values: Alcohol and its 
widespread harms violate basic human 
right and should be regulated against
1.	“We need to recognise that encouraging responsible consumption will reduce alcohol 
related harm and the associated health and externality costs. History shows that 
prohibition drives illicit consumption, health related risk and increased abuse. We 
require a proportionate response” (Australian Grape and Wine Inc., trade association).
2.	“We support the inclusion of reference to relevant human rights and human rights 
instruments such as for example Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (…)” (McCabe Centre for Law & Cancer, NGO).
Abbreviations: CEEV, Comité Européen des Entreprises Vins; WHO, World Health Organization; NGO, non-governmental organisation; IOGT, International 
Organisation of Good Templars; HED, heavy episodic drinking; FCTC, Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
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beverages with no or lower alcohol content. Such framing was 
most commonly adopted by private sector entities, as well as 
(among others) the Permanent Representation of Italy to the 
International Organizations, Latvia’s Ministry of Agriculture, 
and the Ministry of Social Affairs of Estonia (Member States). 
Social Norms
Alcohol (mis)use was also framed as being driven or influenced 
by social norms and traditions, which are suggested by some 
stakeholders to make it harder to elicit behaviour change. 
While social norms were often mentioned by private sector 
entities, this framing was also used by some Member States 
and NGOs to explain challenges in the implementation of 
the GAS. Arguments used in support of this framing include 
appeals to the history of alcoholic beverages, such as that “[w]
ine has been linked to human history since its inception and is 
part of the roots of the land, culture, tradition, history and pride 
of many countries” (Vinos de Chile, trade association). 
Under-regulation 
The framing of alcohol harms as a problem caused by the 
widespread and under-regulated availability, affordability and 
marketing of alcoholic products was adopted by the majority 
of NGOs, academic institutions, Member States and IGOs. 
Policies to restrict availability, affordability and marketing 
have previously been described as the most effective and 
cost-effective ‘best buys.’32 Numerous submissions alluded 
to one or more best buys (sometimes using that term) and 
suggested that under-regulation was caused by a lack of 
political will and resources at the national level, as well as 
“[t]he intrusion of alcohol industry in the global public health 
policy arena” (Global Alcohol Policy Alliance, NGO) which 
has undermined “governments’ ability to act on and progress 
effective regulations and policies” (The Pacific Community, 
IGO), especially in low- and middle-income countries. 
Lack of resources as a reason for the limited national 
progress was also identified by private sector entities, which 
used it to highlight the economic benefits of industry 
involvement in alcohol control. However, most private sector 
entities and three Member States were critical of the concept 
of ‘commercial determinants of health’ (“strategies and 
approaches used by the private sector to promote products 
and choices that are detrimental to health” p. e895)33, which 
according to them “risks portraying private sector engagement 
in a largely negative manner” and “negates the positive work 
of the private sector in activities that directly promote public 
health” (The United States, Member State).
Proposing Solutions
How stakeholders frame the problem and causes of alcohol-
attributable harms has consequences for the (policy) 
solutions that they propose and who is held responsible for 
implementing them (eg, individuals, producers, governments 
or the WHO). The submissions to the consultation revealed 
three aspects of alcohol control that were framed differently 
by different stakeholders: the target population, the scale of 
policy solutions and the stakeholders that should be involved 
in alcohol control efforts.
Targeted Interventions Versus Population-Level Regulation
In the submissions from private sector entities and five 
Member States (Permanent Representation of Italy to the 
International Organization, Latvia’s Ministry of Agriculture, 
the United States, Ministry of Health and Social Protection 
of Colombia and Guyana Mission), alcohol control was 
framed as requiring a targeted approach focused on at-risk 
individuals and risky behaviours. A targeted strategy in these 
submissions typically promoted a “menu of policy options,” 
including (industry-funded) education campaigns to promote 
‘moderation,’ and responsible marketing practices. Many of 
the same stakeholders also applied this targeted approach 
to regulation by emphasising drink-driving legislation and 
legislation to prevent alcohol sale to minors instead of the 
best buys, which they argued would encourage illicit alcohol 
production and trade. Concern about illicit alcohol was 
similarly expressed by the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (IGO), which referred to it as “the worst form 
of harmful consumption of alcohol.” Six NGO submissions 
(including those of various branches of the Green Crescent) 
also adopted a targeted approach based on education and 
awareness-raising interventions but did not encourage 
industry involvement. 
An alternative framing focused on universal, population-
level regulation (ie, the implementation of one or more ‘best 
buys’) aimed at “[s]trengthening rather than loosening the 
market controls on the availability, price and marketing of 
alcohol from the perspective of public health and the public 
interest” (Ministry of Health Bulgaria, Member State) and 
“promoting the principle that market regulation is fundamental 
to effective alcohol policy” (TRAPS programme, The University 
of York, academic institution). This framing was adopted by 
the majority of NGOs, Member States, IGOs and academic 
institutions. 
Local Versus Global Solutions
Stakeholders that proposed targeted solutions to alcohol 
control often also favoured a localised approach specific to the 
national cultural, social and economic context, as opposed to 
what they sometimes called “one size fits all” regulation. The 
Mexican Chamber of the Tequila Industry (trade association) 
argued that due to different levels of commercialisation 
of alcohol in different countries “we can assure that certain 
measures, especially those related to prices or alcohol taxation 
will not have any impact in the reduction of the harmful use of 
alcohol” in certain countries. 
On the other hand, most NGOs, academic institutions, 
Member States and IGOs framed alcohol control as 
an increasingly global issue that requires international 
cooperation and global measures, including legal approaches 
to counteract challenges posed by the globalisation of the media 
environment, international trade agreements, and industry 
interference in policy-making. The most commonly proposed 
solution was a global legally binding regulatory framework 
on alcohol control similar to the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC). This was suggested by 70 NGOs 
(66%), five academic institutions (71%), six Member States 
(20%) and one IGO (25%). Such a framework would among 
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others “counterbalance and constrain negative effects on 
alcohol policies of international trade and investment laws” and 
“constitute a strong symbolic statement, denormalising alcohol 
as a commodity and foodstuff ” (Australasian Professional 
Society on Alcohol and other Drugs, NGO).
Partnership Versus Freedom From Industry Interference 
When it comes to suggesting who should be involved in 
alcohol control, one framing emphasised the importance of 
partnership with industry stakeholders. This framing was 
supported by all private sector entities, some more pro-
industry Member States and IGOs (United States or America, 
Guyana Mission, Permanent Representation of Italy to the 
International Organizations, Ministry of Health and Social 
Protection of Colombia, and UN Conference on Trade and 
Development) and one NGO (International Federation of 
Medical Students’ Association). Most of these stakeholders 
promoted public-private partnerships, self-regulation (eg, 
marketing codes and voluntary labelling initiatives), co-
regulation and industry corporate social responsibility 
activities. The partnership argument supports a “whole of 
society approach” as laid out in the WHO GAS and the UN 
Political Declaration on Non-communicable Diseases. Some 
stakeholder submissions favouring partnership with industry 
also dismissed:
“(…) the assumption that all collaboration with the 
private sector has a deep-set and unsurmountable conflict of 
interest, thus foregoing a previous evaluation of conditions, 
work and evidence. As has been proven above, this doesn’t 
have to be so” (Fundación de Investigaciones Sociales A.C., 
social aspects organisation).
On the other hand, most NGOs, academic institutions, 
Member States and IGOs supported freedom from alcohol 
industry interference and emphasised that, due to inherent 
conflict of interest, the public sector should exclude the 
alcohol industry from decision-making about alcohol control. 
These stakeholders also criticised the role given to the private 
sector in the WHO GAS for compromising the principle “that 
all involved parties have the responsibility not to undermine 
implementation of policies to reduce harmful use of alcohol, 
and that public health should be given deference in relation 
to competing interests” (The SPECTRUM Consortium, 
academic institution). Many stakeholders that used this 
framing suggested that the WHO is best equipped to provide 
countries with the financial and technical support so their 
alcohol policy development work has independence from the 
alcohol industry, “primarily through enhancing the structure of 
the alcohol policy work to support regional offices and Member 
States; taking a stronger approach to industry interference; and 
developing guidelines for what engagement should occur at the 
national and global levels” (Foundation for Alcohol Research 
and Education, NGO).
Justifying and Persuading 
Stakeholders drew on evidence, comparisons between 
tobacco and alcohol control, and specific value systems to 
form justifying frames that support the adoption of certain 
problem and solution ideas and to oppose competing framing. 
The Use of Evidence 
Drawing upon government or industry data and peer-
reviewed research evidence (or lack thereof) were the most 
common ways of justifying problem definitions, causes and 
proposed solutions in the submissions. However, not all 
statements that were claimed to be supported by evidence 
in the submissions are consistent with the current scientific 
consensus on alcohol harms and control. Statements that 
are unfounded or misleading given the current evidence 
base, such as that “[o]ne fact is indisputable: moderate alcohol 
users have a longer life expectancy than abstainers for life” 
(Educ’alcool, industry-funded charity, translated), were 
often made by private sector entities. However, some were 
also found in Member State submissions that used similar 
framing, for example the claim that “while alcohol abuse 
produces serious implications for human health, moderate 
consumption does not imply particular risks, and can even 
produce positive effects” (Permanent Representation of Italy to 
the International Organizations, Member State). 
Most of such statements contained claims that were either 
not supported with references or that misinterpreted the 
referenced studies. An example of the latter is the statement 
that “alcohol consumption is not tied to physical availability 
of alcohol” (Distilled Spirits Council of the United States, 
trade association), which is based on one study that found a 
mismatch between the concentration of alcohol availability 
and an increased likelihood of being a heavy drinker in 
Californian neighbourhoods, and does therefore not support 
the strong claim that “reducing outlets and hours of sale will not 
reduce heavy drinking or total alcohol consumption.” The same 
trade organisation wrote that “studies clearly show that when 
taxes are increased, the consumption of illicit alcohol increases” 
in a paragraph that questions the effectiveness of alcohol 
taxation (alongside that of the best buys more generally). This 
statement references a study concluding that “making alcohol 
more expensive and less available, and banning alcohol 
advertising, are highly cost-effective strategies to reduce 
harm” (p. 2234), which was omitted in the submission.34 
Two private sector entities supported their arguments 
with references to peer-reviewed studies supported by the 
industry-funded International Center for Alcohol Policies 
(now the International Alliance for Responsible Drinking), of 
which one has been critiqued in a letter to the editor on the 
basis of “faulty methodology,” “misconstrued interpretations” 
and “conflict of interest.”35 
Tobacco Control Analogies
Comparison between tobacco control and alcohol control 
is another framing used by actors to justify advocating for 
specific policy measures. The NGOs, academic institutions, 
Member States and IGOs that used this framing argued 
that since the harm caused by alcohol is comparable to that 
caused by tobacco, especially when considering wider societal 
costs, alcohol should receive the same level of urgency and 
control. They also cited evidence that the tobacco and alcohol 
industries use similar approaches to undermine policy to 
further justify an approach similar to the FCTC to be applied 
to the alcohol industry (especially Article 5.3, which protects 
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public health policies from vested interests).
The Use of Value Systems 
Stakeholders appeared to draw on distinct value systems or 
world views to justify and legitimise their framing in the 
submissions. This included values emphasising individual 
responsibility and freedom, and the right to express 
preferences through consumer behaviour, which will loosely 
be referred to as neoliberal values (focusing on neoliberalism 
as an ideology rather than a political project).36 These values 
were drawn upon by private sector entities and some Member 
States to justify their framing of the problem of harmful 
use alcohol as a problem of individual responsibility with 
largely individual consequences, therefore requiring targeted 
interventions that give individuals the knowledge and tools to 
make informed choices. Stakeholders that used this framing 
argued that in the current GAS “too much emphasis is put on 
prohibition and not enough on creating a stable and responsible 
environment” (Belgian Brewers, trade association).
In some submissions, the right to liberty and individual 
choice was also extended to economic actors, which were 
believed to have the right to operate without undue state 
intervention. Private sector entities argued that governments 
should encourage responsible practices by the private sector, 
such as self-regulation and the creation of beverages with low 
or no alcoholic content, instead of using regulations that “create 
market distortions” and “may lead to unintended consequences, 
including growth in the unrecorded and illegal markets” 
(Brazilian Beer Trade Association, trade association). At the 
same time, these stakeholders also stated that governments 
should be free to make decisions without interference from 
IGOs such as the WHO: “For example, taxation is a sovereign 
right and any attempt to require a certain form or level of 
taxation is inappropriate” (Spirits New Zealand, New Zealand 
Winegrowers and the Brewers Association of New Zealand, 
trade associations).
Stakeholders that emphasised the broader harms of alcohol 
and the need for regulation and international tools often drew 
on human rights values. Harmful commodities such as alcohol 
and its harms to society were portrayed as undermining 
among others the right to the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health, as well as the realisation of 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals. As a consequence, 
many NGOs and academic institutions called for all people 
– and especially children and adolescents – to be protected 
from exposure to harmful alcohol consumption, marketing 
practices and other commercial influence, and alcohol-
associated health and secondary harms. Protection of public 
health was seen as both a responsibility and right of national 
governments, and to a smaller extent the WHO: 
“[The right to health] outlines the state’s duty to protect 
people from an infringement of their right to health by 
third parties - including corporations. If products are being 
consumed in a manner hazardous to health, an obligation 
is placed on the state to intervene to protect the right to 
health. This requires nations to develop laws and policies at 
the domestic level that meet these minimum international 
standards” (Alcohol Focus Scotland, NGO).
Discussion
Main Findings and Relation to Previous Literature 
This comprehensive analysis of consultation submissions 
on the implementation of the WHO GAS demonstrates 
the divergent framing adopted by different policy actors. 
Differences in framing were found between: private sector 
entities, five Member States (Permanent Representation 
of Italy to the International Organizations, United States of 
America, Guyana Mission, Ministry of Health and Social 
Protection of Colombia and Latvia’s Ministry of Agriculture) 
and one IGO (UN Conference on Trade and Development), 
who supported a targeted partnership approach to alcohol 
control focused on encouraging individual responsibility and 
behaviour change; and the remainder of the Member States 
and IGOs, as well as NGOs and academic institutions who 
predominantly promoted population-level regulation and 
global action. 
While the focus of this analysis was not to compare these 
two groups directly, our findings are largely consistent with 
previous research analysing the framing and arguments 
used by harmful commodity industries compared to those 
used by government and public health stakeholders.15,28,37 
Such studies are however scarce in the field of alcohol 
control, where most research focuses exclusively on industry 
framing.14,25,27,38 By including submissions from a wide range 
of societal stakeholders, we identified strong support for the 
denormalization of alcohol industry involvement in public 
health policy-making among civil society and most Member 
States. Stakeholders thus went beyond the policy problems 
themselves, to reframe the identity and role of the alcohol 
industry within the global alcohol policy space. Our analysis 
also shows divergence in framing among stakeholders assigned 
to the same stakeholder ‘group,’ which is most notable among 
Member States. The United States of America (which has 
also been found to use industry-friendly framing in a 2017 
consultation on the WHO draft tool to prevent and manage 
conflicts of interest in the development and implementation of 
nutrition programmes15) and the Permanent Representation 
of Italy to the International Organizations (representing Italy 
in various fora including the WHO, Human Rights Council, 
World Trade Organization and World Economic Forum) 
were the biggest outliers and consistently adopted framing 
that mirrored that identified among private actors. 
At the same time, the analysis of submissions by private 
sector entities confirms the consistency by which industry 
actors frame alcohol consumption and control over time 
and in different contexts.14,19,38,39 Examples include diverting 
attention towards individual responsibility as the main 
determinant of and solution to alcohol misuse (while directly 
opposing population-level measures), and positioning 
industry actors as important stakeholders in alcohol control.40 
In addition, harmful commodity industries have a long history 
of challenging and casting doubt on scientific evidence of the 
harmful effects of their products or the effectiveness of policy 
measures, in order to subvert government regulation,41,42 for 
example through the use of neutral appearing charities or 
social aspects organisations to spread (mis)information in line 
with industry interests25,43 and funding research that supports 
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industry interests39,41,42 – examples for both were found in the 
analysed submissions. The framing adopted by private sector 
entities seemed to ignore the evidence that environmental 
factors are key factors contributing to alcohol misuse44,45 and 
that population-level strategies are the most effective form of 
alcohol control32 (compared to, for example, mass education 
campaigns,46 industry self-regulation of alcohol marketing47 
and corporate social responsibility activities48,49). For public 
health advocates, this highlights the importance of identifying 
and disseminating effective counter frames to pre-empt the 
now well-documented ‘alcohol industry playbook.’14,39-41,43,48-50 
To create wide support for public health and human rights-
based approaches around alcohol consumption, ‘fact-
checking’ exercises are likely not enough. Instead, the focus 
may need to be on actively challenging misleading and 
harmful framings in a way that appeals to emotions and 
engages with the audience. There are many channels through 
which public health advocates can put forward their own 
framings of alcohol control, including public consultations, 
policy discussions and (mass) media. Social media in 
particular is often used by alcohol industry stakeholders and 
social aspects organisations to share messages that align with 
their preferred framing of alcohol harms and policy solutions. 
For public health advocates, this is an opportunity to help 
shape the dominant discourse around alcohol by introducing 
frames based on public health evidence and values. When it 
comes to the dissemination of such framing, lessons can be 
learned from public health countermarketing campaigns, 
which are most common in the field of tobacco control. Such 
strategies aim “to reduce the demand for unhealthy products 
by exposing the motives of their producers and portraying 
their marketing activities as outside the boundaries of 
civilized corporate behaviour” (p. 120).51 Key framing could 
focus on adverse health and social consequences of alcohol 
consumption, exposing industry manipulation of consumers, 
policy-makers and the scientific process, their targeting of 
vulnerable populations, the environmental impact of alcohol 
production and human rights violations by the industry.52,53 
However, it is important to avoid the narrowly-focused 
narrative that a simple trade-off between local, individual-
level action or global action at population-level exists. Rather 
these should be considered to be complementary strategies 
which are necessary to comprehensively address alcohol 
consumption (something that was already acknowledged in 
the submissions of some NGOs and academic institutions). 
In this context, it is also important to consider that 
framing is inherently political.21 By using framing analysis to 
understand the value systems or world views that underpin 
particular framings of the problem of alcohol harms, its 
causations and proposed solutions, we have tried to shed 
light on how discourse can be used in alcohol policy-making. 
Policy-making is a political process, and stakeholders use 
power and discourse to shape (or frame) evidence and argue 
for their policy preferences.21,23,24 For example, policies based 
principally on values of individual and corporate freedom 
and responsibility, as promoted by private sector entities, 
are likely to serve commercial interests over public health 
interests, and maintain power imbalances. This links with the 
wider academic debate about whether the ‘neoliberal’ policy 
paradigm that has become dominant since the 1980s enables 
increasingly powerful commercial interests to influence 
public policy while creating barriers for states to implement 
evidence-based public health measures.36 The prioritisation 
of economic outcomes alongside the view that economic 
growth will automatically lead to improvement in social 
outcomes, which is reflected in national policy-making and 
international trade agreements, is believed to lie at the root 
of this,54 creating conflict between governments’ economic 
and public health objectives and increasing the global supply 
of unhealthy commodities, especially in low-and-middle 
income countries.55-57 
Implications and Wider Considerations 
A legally binding treaty on alcohol control as proposed 
by numerous stakeholders in the consultation would 
offer legitimate means for Member States to prioritise the 
implementation of alcohol control measures in the face of 
pressure from industry and international trade rules. Yet, it 
should not be framed as the be-all and end-all solution to 
the harms caused by alcohol. Even the FCTC, the strongest 
instrument to control harmful commodities to date, has not 
been able to forge the necessary action by Member States to 
meet all the Treaty obligations (implementation rate ranged 
between 15% and 88% across Articles in 2016).56,58,59 Problems 
that were identified in the consultation submissions on the 
implementation of the GAS, including sustained industry 
interference and a lack of sufficient capacity and financial 
support, remain relevant for tobacco control.56,59 This suggests 
that public health advocates must remain vigilant to the 
framing and tactics of the alcohol industry even if it were 
to be formally excluded from deliberations and decision-
making; and that increased capacity-building and resource 
mobilisation at the national level are central to the success of 
an international treaty like the FCTC. While there was very 
strong support for a ‘Framework Convention on Alcohol 
Control’ within the consultation, there was less recognition 
of the structures needed to translate such a treaty to actual 
change at the national level.
The WHO has an important position in determining the 
future direction of global alcohol control (including the 
implementation of a binding treaty) given its normative role 
in global discourse and practices. How the WHO weighs up 
the opinions and policy suggestions of different stakeholder 
groups that took part in the consultation on the WHO GAS 
is therefore important to understand. Not much detail of 
this is available on the WHO website, which mentions that 
“[t]he comments received will be taken into consideration in 
the process of developing [a report to the 72nd World Health 
Assembly by the WHO Secretariat] and may serve as an input 
for informal consultation with Member States on the discussion 
paper.” Earlier analyses indicate that WHO policy-making 
processes are relatively resistant to industry interference,13,60 
also specifically at the consultation stage.13 However, it does 
become evident that the consultation hosted by the WHO 
in response to their discussion paper on the implementation 
of the GAS contains misleading statements, such as those 
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casting doubt on the unhealthful effects of alcohol or potential 
solutions. It is therefore essential for the WHO to ensure that 
the decision-making processes which underlie consultations 
are objective, evidence-based and aligned with explicit values 
of improving the health of populations. At the same time, 
the WHO also has an important role to play in countering 
misinformation that could harm health. The submissions to 
the 2019 consultation on the implementation of GAS, some 
of which contain misinformation and misleading framing, 
are publicly available on the WHO website, which could 
lead to the inadvertent amplification of misinformation. 
We therefore welcome the disclaimer that has been added 
to the submissions of a more recent consultation on WHO’s 
‘Working document for development of an action plan to 
strengthen implementation of the GAS.’61 This disclaimer 
makes clear that “[t]he World Health Organization does not 
warrant that the information contained in this document is 
complete and correct.” In addition to this, the WHO could 
consider including rebuttals or ‘tags’ when publishing 
submission to public consultations. This has been suggested 
as a way of combatting misinformation in other contexts.62
There is a need for further analysis of the role of public 
consultations and the way in which they do or do not address 
the inherent power and resource imbalances that may exist 
between policy actors taking part, and the weight afforded to 
different agents. As Marks discusses in his in-depth analysis 
of partnerships with industry and industry’s role in policy-
making, there needs to be more critical reflection on the 
implications of including industry in the policy-making 
process, as such practices clearly create channels for industry 
influence and misinformation.63 Marks also argues for greater 
recognition that within public consultations and other 
decision-making process, the views and interests of certain 
actors, such as the public, can be afforded greater weight 
than those of others who hold vested commercial interests 
in the outcome of specific policy decisions.63 This could also 
take into account areas of competence, and the recognition 
that alcohol producers are different from other stakeholder 
groups in the sense that they do not experience, pay for or 
study alcohol harms and policies to mitigate it. Considering 
the known strategies that the alcohol industry uses in an 
attempt to dominate the discourse around alcohol control and 
undermine public health efforts to address alcohol harms, 
the WHO should consider the call from NGOs, academic 
institutions and Member States to terminate its ‘dialogue’ with 
the alcohol industry, as is the case with the tobacco industry, 
and to create more meaningful means of participation for civil 
society. That being said, public health advocates can continue 
to strengthen their capacity to counter industry frames and 
develop their own persuasive evidence-based narratives and 
framing, regardless of whether industry takes part in WHO 
consultations.
Strengths and Limitations 
There are various frameworks to analyse the political activities 
used by harmful commodity industries to influence policy-
making, as well as various studies on the use of framing 
by alcohol industry actors.14,25,26 We adopted an inductive 
and iterative approach which allowed for the emergence 
and identification of framing from the data. Framing is a 
subjective practice rooted in social constructivism, which 
means that frames will be interpreted differently by different 
people. The framings that are presented above represent what 
was identified by four independent analyses of the data and 
finalised through discussion to reach consensus. A limitation 
of framing analysis applied to textual data like consultation 
submissions is that it cannot discern what motivations and 
intentions underlie the adoption of a particular framing. In 
the same way, framing analysis cannot predict how those 
assessing the worth of those submissions will respond to 
the frames and arguments adopted. Instead, we have sought 
to put our results in context using previous studies with 
different and complementary methodologies. Future research 
should address the implications of public consultations and 
other means to increase participation in deliberations about 
alcohol control organised by the WHO, to analyse the role 
of consultations in WHO’s final outputs and the influence of 
different stakeholders in the process. 
Conclusion
Alcohol control is a contested policy field in which different 
stakeholders use different framing as part of their effort to set 
the agenda and influence what policy solutions are considered 
and adopted. Framing analysis is an important tool in policy 
analysis as it allows for the identification of the underlying 
assumptions and values of different policy options, and assists 
in their assessment. This analysis of submissions to a WHO 
consultation on the GAS identified two divergent framings: 
one that focuses on excessive alcohol use on an individual level 
and one that focuses on alcohol consumption as a collective, 
population-wide problem. The divergent framings have 
consequences for the strategies that are proposed for reducing 
alcohol harms. There is a need for greater consideration of 
the interests that are served by these different framings and 
how closely they align with WHO’s public health and health 
equity ambitions. Understanding this is a precondition for 
countering misleading frames. If improving the health of 
populations is to be made central in future global tools and 
strategies to prevent alcohol-related harms, WHO must 
carefully consider how it can ensure that engagement with 
industry in any form does not undermine public health goals, 
including during the process of formal consultations. 
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